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INTRODUCTION
German antitrust law, like that of the European Economic Community
(EEC),1 contains special provisions designed to control the conduct of
t Chairman, German Federal Cartel Office, Berlin, Germany; Professor of Law, Free
University, Berlin. M.CJ. 1959, New York University.
1. The basic provisions of the antitrust law of the European Economic Community are
found in articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. For a
discussion of the provisions and a translation of the regulations promulgated under them, see
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market-dominating enterprises. The approach of each of these bodies of
law differs from the American antitrust approach, which is primarily con-
cerned with the existence of power to dominate markets rather than with
the manner in which market-dominating firms conduct their operations.
This difference is reflected in the remedies available under each law to
counteract monopoly power. Whereas suppression or correction of specific
monopolistic practices is the only remedy available under German and
EEC antitrust law, the primary remedy for violations of section 2 of the
Sherman Act2 is to dissolve the monopoly.3
Critics of both systems have questioned whether either approach is alone
sufficient to control abuses by monopolists. Some Europeans view the ab-
sence of dissolution powers in European statutes as a serious weakness in
the effectiveness of the statutes.4 Similarly, some American commentators
have suggested that a system of conduct control like that in EEC and Ger-
man antitrust law could bolster enforcement efforts under section 2 of the
Sherman Act, particularly in actions against oligopolists, where dissolution
may not be either feasible or effective.5 For this reason, the German effort
to control the conduct of market-dominating enterprises is of particular in-
terest to those who work with U.S. antitrust laws.
This Article first outlines the legislative development and current provi-
sions of German competition law governing market-dominating enter-
prises. Various problems in applying the law are then analyzed in light of
administrative and judicial practice. The Article concludes by evaluating
the present operation of the German system.
I
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT
The German competition statute governing market-dominating enter-
prises, the Act Against Restraints of Competition (GWB), 6 is based largely
D. BAROUNOS, D. HALL, & J.R. JAMES, EEC ANTi-TRusT LAW (1975); BusINESS INTERNA-
TIONAL S.A., EUROPE'S RuLES OF COMPETITION (1976).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
3. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., [1969] Trade Cas. 1 72,688 (D. Mass. 1969).
4. In its first biennial report, the German Monopolies Commission recommended, inter
alia, the introduction of dissolution powers insofar as bank holdings of shares of industrial
and commercial enterprises are concerned. See GERMAN MONOPOLIES COMMISSION,
HAUPTGUTACHTEN DER MONOPOLKOMMISSION 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MEHR
WETTBEWERB IST MOGLICH].
5. See Edwards, Control of the Single Frr" Its Place in Antitrust Policy, 30 LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 465 (1965). For a comparative analysis of the antitrust laws of the member coun-
tries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) relating to
market-dominating enterprises, see OROANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DE-
VELOPMENT, MARKET POWER AND THE LAW (1970).
6. Act Against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrlinkungen),
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on the neoliberal concept of a competitive market economy in which the
state's role is actively to promote competition.7 The state is to do this by
taking action against undue concentration and restraints on competition.
Where effective competition is not possible, the state is to control the mar-
ket conduct of business enterprises so as to achieve the same economic re-
sults as would obtain under competitive conditions.
This approach was reflected in the first draft of a post-World War II Ger-
man law against restraints of competition, 8 which provided that "holders of
economic power shall behave in business activities as if they were exposed
to effective competition."9 The Government Bill of 1955 substituted a nar-
rower provision for that contained in the first draft. The newer approach
treated only two specific abuses of a market-dominating position: the fixing
of prices and business terms, and the use of tying clauses requiring custom-
ers to buy unrelated products or services. This 1955 draft provision is virtu-
ally identical to that enacted in 1957 as GWB section 22.
The 1957 statute, although modeled after the 1955 approach, also re-
tained the broader first draft for its interpretive value. According to the
explanatory memorandum that accompanied the 1955 Bill, the "as if com-
petition" test expressed in the first draft was to be used to determine
whether prices or business terms were abusive. Proof of an abuse, the mem-
orandum said, required the German Federal Cartel Authority to demon-
strate "that the prices or business terms differ considerably from what they
would be in a situation of effective competition and that the difference is
not justified by economic reasons."' 10 But the memorandum did not suggest
how to determine in a particular case whether, and to what extent, prices
and business terms in a dominated market would differ if substantial com-
petition existed in that market.
After the adoption in 1957 of section 22, many jurists felt that the stat-
ute's scope was too narrow in two respects. First, it failed to restrict the
July 27, 1957, [19571 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] 11081, asrepublishedApr. 4, 1974, [1974] BGBI
I 869, amended, Law of June 28, 1976, [19761 BGBI 1 917 [hereinafter cited as GWB]. For an
English translation and discussion of the Act as currently amended, see 2 GUIDE TO LEGISLA-
TION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (OECD), pt. D; MUELLER & SCHNEIDER, GESETZ
GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN (KARTELLGESETZ)-THE GERMAN LAW AGAINST
RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION (1973).
7. See3 BUSINESS REGULATION IN THE COMMON MARKET NATIONS 83-97 (H. Blake ed.
1969); Markert, Developments in InternationalAntitrust Law, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 697, 703-04
(1975).
8. Josten Draft of 1949, reprinted inE. GONTHER, PROBLEME DER FUSIONSKONTROLLE 17-
18 (1970).
9. Id at 21. Translations of non-statutory German language materials quoted in this Arti-
cle are the author's translations unless otherwise indicated.
10. Bundestagdrucksache 1158, Annex 1, § 17 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Bundestag Doc.],
reprinted in H. MOLLER-HENNEBERG & G. SCHWARTz, GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBE-
SCHRANKUNGEN 1092 (1958).
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practices of market-dominating firms outside contractual relationships with
customers. Second, it applied only to practices in markets where the firm
concerned had a dominant position. To correct these shortcomings, section
22 was amended in 1966 to give the Cartel Authority the power to prohibit
any abusive practice of a market-dominating firm, whether or not the prac-
tice occurred in the dominated market. This amendment extended the scope
of section 22 to protect both actual and potential competitors and to guar-
antee their freedom to compete.
A further amendment in 1973 added a new definition of market domina-
tion to make section 22 easier to apply. Under the newly added structural
criterion of section 22(l)(2), a firm is considered to be market dominating if
it has a paramount market position relative to its competitors. The 1973
amendment also established a series of rebuttable market share presump-
tions. The Parliament expected these new provisions to strengthen signifi-
cantly the Cartel Authority's ability to control abuses by market-
dominating enterprises.
II
THE CURRENT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The GWB as amended regulates market-dominating enterprises in sev-
eral respects. First, section 22 empowers the Cartel Authority to prohibit by
administrative action "abusive practices by market-dominating enter-
prises."" Second, section 26(2) bars market-dominating enterprises from
"either unfairly hinder[ing] . . . another enterprise" or discriminating
against it. 12 Third, section 24 empowers the Federal Cartel Office to pro-
hibit mergers that create or strengthen a market-dominating position.' 3
Before any of these provisions apply, two conditions must be met. First,
an enterprise must act "as a supplier or buyer of a certain type of goods or
commercial services."'14 Market domination must, therefore, be determined
separately as to each type of goods or commercial services. Second, a firm
must be "market dominating." As defined by section 22, a firm dominates a
market when "it has no competitor,"' 5 is "not exposed to substantial com-
petition,"' 6 or "has a paramount market position in relation to its competi-
tors."' 7 Where two or more firms not in substantial competition jointly
meet any one of these three tests, the prohibitions against market domina-
tion apply to them as well.
11. GWB § 22(5), [1973] BGBI 1918.
12. Id. § 26(2), [19571 BGB1I 11087.
13. Id. § 24, [1957] BGBI 1 1087.
14. Id. § 22(l)(1), [1973] BGBI I 918.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. § 22(I)(2), [1973] BGBI 1918.
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To define further these tests of market domination, the GWB establishes
rebuttable presumptions of market domination based on a firm's market
share. A single firm presumptively falls under the statutory definition of
market domination if it "has a market share of at least one-third for a cer-
tain type of goods or commercial services" and "recorded [sales] of...
DM 250 million [or more] in the last completed business year." 18 Three or
fewer firms are presumed to be market-dominating if they have a combined
market share of fifty or more percent. 19 Similarly, five or fewer firms are
presumed to be market dominating if they have a combined market share
of two-thirds or more.20 The latter two presumptions do not apply to firms
that individually have recorded sales of less than DM 100 million in the last
completed business year.21
If a firm is both "a supplier or buyer of a certain type of goods or com-
mercial services" and is market dominating within the meaning of section
22, then the Cartel Authority may administratively prohibit abusive prac-
tices in which the firm engages. The full scope of this authority is not clear,
since section 22 does not define the term "abusive practices." The section's
utility as an enforcement measure is limited by the inability of private par-
ties to bring actions under it, by the discretionary character of government
enforcement, 22 and by the merely prospective effect of successful govern-
ment enforcement actions.
Under section 26(2), market-dominating firms may not unfairly hinder or
discriminate against other enterprises without justification in business activ-
ities usually open to the other enterprises. Unlike section 22, private en-
forcement actions may be brought under section 26(2). Because practices
prohibited by section 26(2) may also violate section 22, actions brought by
the Government against exclusionary or discriminatory practices of market-
dominating enterprises are frequently based on both statutory provisions.
Section 24 enables the Federal Cartel Office to prohibit the merger of
enterprises that exceed certain size and market volume specifications, if the
merger would be likely to create or strengthen a market-dominating posi-
tion of the parties. But the statute provides an exception, permitting the
merger to be effected if "the restraint of competition is outweighed by ad-
vantages to the whole economy resulting from the merger or if the merger is
justified by a predominating public interest. . ... 23 Power to authorize a
merger under these conditions is vested in the Federal Minister for Eco-
18. Id. § 22(3)(1), [1973] BGBI 1918.
19. Id. § 22(3)(2)(a), [1973] BGB1 1 918.
20. Id. § 22(3)(2)(b), [1973] BGBlI 1918.
21. Id. § 22(3)(2), [19731 BGB1 1 918.
22. Heil & Vorbrugg, Antitrust Law in West Germany: Recent Developments in German and
Common Market Regulation, 8 INTL LAW. 349, 366 (1974).
23. GWB § 24(3), [1957] BGBI 11087.
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nomic Affairs. 24 The importance of section 22 in merger activities of
market-dominating enterprises is reduced substantially by the more com-
prehensive rules governing mergers in sections 23 and 24. These provisions
go much further than to restrict mergers of market-dominating enterprises.
Because of the complexity of the merger rules, this Article will treat mergers
between market-dominating enterprises only in passing.25
III
ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE
Three broad enforcement questions emerge from the numerous cases that
have been brought against anticompetitive practices of market-dominating
firms. First, are the terms "a certain type of goods or commercial services"
and "in specific markets" as used in section 22 synonymous with the rele-
vant product and geographic market concepts, and how are these terms ap-
plied in practice? Second, how are the various criteria of market
domination interpreted; how are they related to each other; and what is the
function of the market share presumptions? Third, what constitutes an
"abusive practice" by a market-dominating enterprise?
A. THE RELEVANT MARKET
It is now well established in judicial and administrative practice that the
term "in regard to a certain type of goods or commercial services" in section
22 is synonymous with the relevant product market concept. This follows
from the term "market-dominating enterprise," which implies the existence
of a dominated product market. That the relevant market must also be de-
termined geographically is evident from section 22(2), which speaks of sub-
stantial competition between firms "either in general, or in specific
markets." Inserted during the Parliamentary debate in 1957, this clause was
designed to ensure that section 22 also covered enterprises that dominate
regional markets.26
The definitions of market domination in section 22 do not otherwise
specify how the relevant product and geographic markets are to be deter-
mined in particular cases. The parliamentary report to the 1966 amendment
expressly stated that it is impossible to define the relevant market in the
statute.27 Similarly, the parliamentary report to the 1973 amendment noted
24. ld;see general Markert, The New German Antitrust Reform La~q 19 ANTITRUST BULL.
135, 139-47 (1974).
25. For a critical review of the first two years of merger law enforcement, see MEHR
WETTBEWERB IST MOGLICH, supranote 4, at 463-543.
26. Bundestag Doe. 3644, § 17 (1955), reprinted in H. MOLLER-HENNEBERO & G.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 1190.
27. Bundestag Doc. IV/3533, § 22 (1964), reprinted in [1965] WIRTSCHtAFT UND
WETBEwERB 836 [hereinafter cited as WuW].
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that the relevant geographic market could be either all or part of the domes-
tic market.28 It added, however, that imports and potential competition by
foreign firms must be taken into account when assessing competitive condi-
tions in a domestic market.
L Product Market
The test applied in judicial and administrative practice to determine the
relevant product market is to include as part of the market all products or
services that by their "characteristics, purpose, and price are so closely re-
lated that the reasonable consumer will view them as intended to satisfy a
specific demand and consider them as interchangeable."2 9 The test focuses
on the judgment of the average consumer and has been applied to define
relevant markets for such products as manual price labeling machines, 30
sporting goods fairs, 31 tampons,32 aluminum ignots and various types of
aluminum semifinishes,33 electricity and natural gas,34 high-dosed vitamin
B-12,35 benzodiazepam tranquilizers,36 and factoring.37
Once the relevant product market has been determined, only rarely has it
been further divided into submarkets. This did occur in the Sachs case,38
where the Berlin Court of Appeals held that the market for automobile
clutches had to be divided into separate markets for supplies to automobile
manufacturers and to independent automotive parts dealers. 39 This was
necessary, the court said, because of the almost total independence of the
submarkets from one another, causing a wide differential in the prices that
manufacturers charged the two groups of purchasers.
Despite its wide acceptance and frequent application, this test of the rele-
vant product market remains a controversial issue in many cases. No practi-
cable means has yet been found by which to determine whether a
reasonable consumer would consider products interchangeable. Especially
28. Bundestag Doc. 7/765, § 22 (1973), reprinted in [1973] WuW 587.
29. Judgment of Feb. 18, 1969 ("Handpreisauszeichner"), OLG, Berlin, [1969] WuW/E
623, 624, OLG 995, 996.
30. Id.
31. Judgment of July 22, 1968 ("Sportartikelmesse"), OLG, Berlin, [1968] WuW/E 849,
851, OLG 907, 909.
32. Decision of Nov. 18, 1974 ("o.b."), BKartA, [1975] WuW/E 343, BKartA 1571.
33. Decision of Dec. 23, 1974 ("Kaiser-VAW"), BKartA, [1975] WuW/E 419, BKartA 1571.
34. Decision of Mar. 9, 1976 ("Erdgas Schwaben"), BKartA, [1977] WuW/E 59, BKartA
1647.
35. Judgment of July 3, 1976 ('Vitamin-B-12"), 67 BGHZ 105, 113-14, [1976] WuW/E 783,
788, BGH 1465, 1470.
36. Judgment of Dec. 16, 1976 ("Valium"), 68 BGHZ 23, 27-28, [1977] WuW/E 255, 257,
BGH 1445, 1447.
37. GERMAN FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNuAL REPORT 43 (1975) (copy on file at the
offices of the Cornell International Law Journal.
38. Judgment of Dec. 1, 1976 ("Sachs"), OLG, Berlin, [1977] WuW/E 265, OLG 1745.
39. Id.
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where many people use a particular product but hold differing views as to
its interchangeability, almost any decision about the relevant product mar-
ket is open to dispute.
Absent precise and practicable means to measure the average consumer's
market perceptions, the Cartel Authority or the court must often base its
determination of the relevant product market on its best estimate of what
the consumer regards as reasonably interchangeable. 40 So long as such
judgments are consistent, free of arbitrariness, and subject to judicial re-
view, this method is reasonably workable. As the number of decided cases
grows, a foundation will be built upon which future relevant market deci-
sions can be based.
2 Geographic Market
In most cases brought under the rules governing market-dominating
firms, the relevant geographic market is the entire nation. Separate regional
markets have, however, been held to exist in cases involving the supply of
cement, electricity, and other commerical services.4 1 As in relevant product
market cases, product overlap is often the principal obstacle to accurate
definition of the relevant geographic market. For instance, low demand for
cement causes many producers to ship their cement to more distant markets
in order to sell it, despite the higher transportation cost this entails. The
resulting product overlap makes determination of the relevant regional
market difficult, often requiring the same sort of pragmatic judgment as is
necessary to define the relevant product market.
Although the relevant geographic market is not readily determinable
where regional boundaries are at issue, it is well established that the rele-
vant geographic market cannot extend beyond national boundaries. But
under guidelines contained in the report of the Bundestag Economic Com-
40. This pragmatic approach is described by the following observation: "The interaction of
suppliers fills the sales territory, not in well-defined and segregated markets, each like a fenced
field, but in the way a fog fills a landscape-as a continuum, of varying density, here thicker,
there thinner, without clear boundaries." Edwards, The Changing Dimensions of Business
Power, in DAS UNTERNEHMEN IN DER RECHTSORDNUNG, FESTGABE FOR H. KRONSTEIN 237,
241 (1967). See also OECD, MARKET POWER AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 45-46:
The cases have made it clear the relevant market in the sense of being the only possi-
ble result of an application of objective criteria does in reality not exist. The various
'tests' or formulae that are applied by the courts and administrative agencies such as
'functional interchangeability,' 'cross-elasticity of demand,' 'peculiar characteristics or
uses,' are merely several aspects of a policy decision which has to take into account
many other aspects and the essence of which is to determine which of several possible
market definitions is most appropriate in the individual case in the light of the statu-
tory purpose of the law to be applied.
41. See, eg., Judgment of Oct. 25, 1974 ("Zementmahlanlage"), OLG, Berlin, [1975]
WuW/E OLG 1534, 1536; Decision of Dec. 22, 1976 ("Zementmahlanlage"), BKartA, [1977]
WuW/E 585, BKartA 1667. A further example is the Springer Newspaperscase. Seenotes 84-
87 infra and accompanying text.
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mittee on the 1973 GWB amendment, the Cartel Authority may consider
the competitive situation in foreign markets if it affects competition domes-
tically. The Authority may, in making its enforcement decisions, take into
account the effects of imports and of potential competition from foreign
firms able and willing to enter the German market.42
3. Releiant Market Definition and Mergers
An important unresolved issue in the regulation of market-dominating
enterprises is whether the relevant market should be defined differently
where merger rules apply. The different aims of conduct control and merger
control might support such a distinction. The inclusion in section 22(2) of
relative market power in relation to individual customers suggests that there
is some basis in existing law for such an approach.43 Even so, the courts are
unlikely to be willing to define the relevant market in merger cases by crite-
ria other than those applied in cases brought under section 22.44
B. THE MARKET-DOMINATING POSITION
Of the three statutory criteria by which section 22 defines dominant mar-
ket power,45 the first-absence of any competition whatsoever-is the easi-
est to administer. But since true monopolies are rare, this criterion has little
practical utility. By contrast, the second criterion-lack of exposure to sub-
stantial competition-has been and still is of great practical importance. It
is particularly relevant to the enforcement of section 22 against oligopolists,
since section 22(2) provides expressly that its prohibitions apply if there is
no substantial competition among the oligopolists. Application of the new
paramount market position criterion to oligopoly situations is therefore
necessarily linked to the substantial competition question.
1. Substantial Competition
A central factor in controlling the conduct of market-dominating firms is
the presence or absence of substantial competition. It is generally agreed
that the question of whether a firm is exposed to substantial competition is
determined by a market conduct test: is the firm's market conduct con-
42. Bundestag Doc. 7/765, supranote 28, at 587-88.
43. According to the second sentence of § 26(2), the prohibition against unfair hindrance
and unjustified discrimination also applies to firms "insofar as suppliers or purchasers of a
certain type of goods or commercial services depend on them to such an extent that sufficient
and reasonable possibilities of dealing with other enterprises do not exist." GWB § 26(2),
[1957] BGBI 1 1087.
44. The question would become moot if the proposal of the Federal Cartel Office to sepa-
rate merger law from the present market domination standard were adopted. See GERMAN
FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 20 (1976) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell
International Law Journal).
45. Seenotes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
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trolled by competitive forces, or can it act without having to consider the
possible actions and reactions of competitors? It is unclear, however,
whether and to what extent firms must actually use the competitive means
at their disposal in order to satisfy the substantial competition require-
ment.46 Another open question is whether a finding that a firm is not ex-
posed to substantial competition requires consideration of the entire range
of possible competitive activity, or whether it is sufficient that substantial
competition does not exist with respect to the particular activity alleged to
be abusive.
The Federal Cartel Office follows the "parameter" theory, requiring that
firms compete actively with other enterprises in order to satisfy the substan-
tial competition requirement. The Office thereby rejects the "mosaic" the-
ory, which would permit an aggregation of marginally competitive activities
to constitute substantial competition.
The Berlin Court of Appeals in its Valium judgment adopted, at least in
part, the parameter theory of the Cartel Office.47 Substantial competition,
the court said, requires "a dynamic struggle of the suppliers acting and re-
acting with a view toward influencing the buyer."48 The court noted the
various means of competition, and emphasized that price was of "para-
mount importance." 4 9 Competition by means other than price could consti-
tute substantial competition only if consumers were given benefits
comparable to price reductions, according to the court. Applying this stan-
dard, it held that the company supplying Valium and Librium in Germany,
German Hoffimann-La Roche AG, was not exposed to substantial competi-
tion, since no price competition for the products existed and consumers
were not otherwise benefited.
The Federal Supreme Court has not yet taken a definite stand on what
constitutes substantial competition. In its Vitamin B-12 judgment, 50 the
court held that substantial reductions in the market share of the allegedly
46. The Federal Supreme Court considered this question in a case presenting the issue of
whether there was sufficient price competition to permit resale price maintenance for brand
name articles. The court stated that, despite parallel market behavior, a situation of "competi-
tive tension" nonetheless met the substantial competition standard. Judgment of Feb. 26, 1970
('Tennisbhlle"), 53 BGHZ 298, [1970] WuW/E 545, BGH 1093.
47. Judgment of Jan. 5, 1976 ("Valium"), OLG, Berlin, [1976] WuW/E 313, OLG 1645.
48. Id at 318, OLG 1650.
49. Id
50. Judgment of July 3, 1976 ("Vitamin-B-l2"), 67 BGHZ 105, [1976] WuW/E 783, BGH
1435. In this case, the Federal Cartel Office attacked the prices charged by the German drug
manufacturer Ernst Merck for its vitamin B-12 products. It was found that Merck's market
share had declined from 32.8 percent in 1966 to 20.9 percent in 1974, while the share of
Steigerwald had risen from 8.9 percent in 1966 to 33.8 percent in 1974 because of price reduc-
tions effected by that firm. But Merck's higher prices meant that its sales still exceeded
Steigerwald's and that Merck remained the leading seller of vitamin B-12. Id at 790, BGH
1442.
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dominant firm caused by competitors' price cuts not only barred a finding
of paramount market position, but demonstrated that the firm was exposed
to substantial competition. The court has not, however, further elaborated
how the term "substantial competition" is to be interpreted and, in particu-
lar, whether the strong emphasis by the Berlin Court of Appeals on price
competition is to be followed. In its Valium judgment, the supreme court
applied only the paramount market position criterion, leaving open
whether it agreed with the court of appeals position that German
Hoffmann-La Roche was not exposed to substantial competition. 51
2. Paramount Market Position
The paramount market position criterion, added to the statutory scheme
by the 1973 amendment, reflects the Parliament's judgment that the sub-
stantial competition standard is often too difficult to apply effectively.:52 The
Parliament therefore sought to reduce the burden of proof borne by the
Cartel Office in enforcement cases by supplementing the negative stan-
dard-absence of substantial competition-with an affirmative standard:
paramount market position. Section 22(l)(2) was also intended to enlarge
the scope of the market domination concept in at least one respect. Four
market structure variables were added as determinants of paramount mar-
ket position,53 extending the paramount market position term to encompass
vertical and conglomerate market power. This formulation complements
the new merger rules, which govern vertical and conglomerate as well as
horizontal mergers.
The legislative documents do not clearly elucidate the relationship be-
tween the substantial competition and paramount market position criteria
of section 22. The latter was at one point termed a "new, additional stan-
dard of market power." 54 Yet the same document also defined paramount
market position as the "scope of [a firm's] behavior in applying its competi-
tive means." s55 At least arguably, therefore, section 22(1)(2) was not in-
tended by the Parliament to be a pure market structure test that excludes all
elements of market conduct. Rather, a firm could occupy a paramount mar-
ket position yet also be exposed to substantial competition.
The Federal Supreme Court adopted this interpretation of the statute in
51. Judgment of Dec. 16, 1976 ("Valium"), 68 BGHZ 23, [1977] WuW/E 255, BGH 1445.
52. The purpose of the paramount market position criterion is extensively discussed in the
Report of the Committee on the Economy, Bundestag Doc. 7/765, supra note 28, at 586-89.
53. These variables are the firm's "share of the market, its financial strength, its access to the
supply or sales markets for goods and services, its links with other enterprises, and the legal or
actual barriers to the market entry of other enterprises." GWB § 22(l)(2), [1973] BGBI 1918.
54. Bundestag Doc. VI/2520 at 21 (1971).
55. Id
1978]
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its Vitamin B-12judgment.5 6 The court held that the question of whether a
firm occupied a paramount market position could be resolved only upon
consideration of competitive conditions in the relevant market. But in its
Valium judgment six months later57 the court elaborated upon its position,
holding that a firm could be found to occupy a paramount market position,
even though it was exposed to substantial competition in the same market
"as long as it possesses a predominant scope of action in its competitive
behavior. '5 8
Exposure to substantial competition thus does not bar a finding of para-
mount market position and market domination. The court did not further
define the "scope of action" condition to this rule's applicability. But by
confirming the finding below that German Hoffmann-La Roche had a par-
amount market position solely because it was the leading seller of
benzodiazepam tranquilizers in Germany, the court left little doubt that the
paramount market position criterion is not merely another market conduct
test like the substantial competition standard.
This approach is arguably not supported by competition theory; in a sub-
stantially competitive market, there is no dominant market power.5 9 But
this criticism overlooks the fact that the Parliament is free to ensure the
practicability of the law by adopting less complex criteria, such as market
share, which may establish market domination irrespective of whether sub-
stantial competition can be shown in the individual case.
In two recent cases, the Berlin Court of Appeals followed the approach of
the supreme court. In the merger case Erdgas Schwaben,60 the court of ap-
peals found that an electricity supplier, Lechwerke Augsburg, had a mo-
nopoly in the supply of electricity for light and power61 and therefore
occupied a paramount market position in the heating energy market. In the
Springer Newspapers case,62 the court merely considered whether substan-
tial reductions of Axel Springer Verlag AG's share of the relevant market
indicated that the firm did not have a predominant scope of action, in spite
of its large market share. The paramount market position test of section
22(l)(2) may thus be applied in several circumstances: merger cases such as
56. Judgment of July 3, 1976 ("Vitamin-B-12"), 67 BGHZ 104, 115, [1976] WuW/E 783,
787, BGH 1435, 1469.
57. Judgment of Dec. 16, 1976 ("Valium"), 68 BGHZ 23, 28, [1977] WuW/E 255, 259, BGH
1445, 1449.
58. Id
59. See, e.g., Lubbert, Der Begriffder iiberragenden Mark!stellung, in § 22.Abs. 1 Nr. 2 GWB
unter besonderer Berickichtigung der Entscheidungsfpraxi, [1977] WuW 559, 568.
60. Judgment of Mar. 23, 1977 ("Erdgas Schwaben"), OLG, Berlin, [1978] WuW/E 157,
OLG 1895.
61. Lechwerke Augsburg produced 80 percent of the electricity in the relevant market.
62. Judgment of Jan. 26, 1977 ("Kombinationstarif"), OLG, Berlin, [1977] WuW/E 343,
OLG 1767.
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Erdgas Schwaben, anticompetitive practice cases such as Springer
Newspapers, and monopolistic pricing policy cases such as Valium.
3. Market-Dominating Oligopolies
The applicability of section 22(2), defining market domination by oligo-
polists, has only recently become an issue in the cases. In an interlocutory
ruling in the Valium case, the Berlin Court of Appeals indicated that the
question of whether German Hoffmann-La Roche held a market-
dominating position would also be considered in light of section 22(2).63
The court elaborated upon this position in several respects. First, a firm
could not be found to have dominated a market both individually under
section 22(1) and as part of an oligopoly under section 22(2). Such findings,
the court said, are mutually exclusive. Second, where the Cartel Office al-
leges that abusive prices have been charged, it need only show that there is
no substantial price competition between the oligopolists in order to meet
the test of section 22(2).64 Third, if a market-dominating oligopoly is al-
leged to exist, all alleged oligopolists must be made parties to the proceed-
ings. This last rule conflicts with past practice of the Federal Cartel Office,
which in several cases proceeded against individual oil companies although
it regarded all major oil companies to be a market-dominating oligopoly.65
The new rule will undoubtedly cause great practical difficulties, particularly
in merger cases.
4. Market Share Presumptions
Section 22(3) establishes rebuttable presumptions of market domination
where monopolists or oligopolists exceed specified market share percent-
ages and annual sales amounts. According to the report of the Bundestag
Economic Committee, when the facts of a case cause a presumption to be
raised, it is highly likely that a market-dominating position exists. 66 But the
committee qualified its conclusion, stating that where the presumptions
arise, the Cartel Office must consider any firm's substantiated argument
that it is exposed to substantial competition and does not occupy a para-
mount market position. This caveat eases somewhat the burden of proof
that the presumptions place on the respondent firms.
In practice, the market share presumptions of section 22(3) enable the
Cartel Office to investigate, pursuant to section 46, possible abuses by an
63. [1978] WuW 28-29.
64. The court simultaneously rejected this parameter approach in the single firm situation
where, in the court's opinion, all relevant competitive activities in the market must be consid-
ered.
65. GERMAN FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 41 (1967) (copy on file at the
offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
66. Bundestag Doc. 7/765, supranote 28, at 588.
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alleged market-dominating enterprise if the Authority has some reason to
believe that an abuse has been committed.6 7 A number of investigations of
pricing policy and other aspects of business conduct have been made on this
basis.68 But the presumptions have not been given any more than presump-
tive weight by the courts. For example, in the Valium case, the Berlin Court
of Appeals noted that German Hoffmann-La Roche controlled approxi-
mately fifty percent of the tranquilizer market and was, therefore, presumed
to be a market-dominating enterprise.6 9 Instead the court went on to draw
its conclusion not from this, but from the fact that the firm was not exposed
to substantial competition. The same analysis was adopted by the court in
the Springer Newspapers case.
70
Like the paramount market position standard, the market share pre-
sumptions are also a key element in many merger cases.7' The Federal Car-
tel Office noted this fact in its decision in the Haindl-Holtzmann merger
case.72 The importance of the presumptions rests on the fact that, by shift-
ing the burden of proof from the Cartel Office, they require the merging
firms to show that there has been competitive conduct in the past and that
competition in that market will continue after the merger is effected.
C. THE ABUSE CONCEPT
Under section 22, the Cartel Office brings enforcement actions against
two principal abuses of a market-dominating position: exploitation of cus-
tomers, such as by charging unduly high prices, and the use of exclusionary
practices against actual or potential competitors. 73 The relative importance
of each of these two main aspects of abuse control under section 22 is an
unsettled question. The German Federal Government and the Monopolies
67. Judgment of Apr. 30, 1974, OLG, Berlin, [1974] WuW/E 545, OLG 1463.
68. A typical example is the 1974 investigation of Volkswagenwerk AG, Opel AG, and Ford
AG. SeeGERMAN FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNuAL REPORT 54 (1974) (copy on file at the
offices of the Cornell International Law Journal.
69. Judgment of Jan. 5, 1976 ("Valium Librium"), OLG, Berlin, [1976] WuW/E 313, OLG
1645.
70. Judgment of Jan. 26, 1977 ("Kombinationstarif'), OLG, Berlin, [1977] WuW/E 343,
OLG 1767.
71. See, eg., Judgment of Dec. 1, 1976 ("Sachs"), OLG, Berlin, [1977] WuW/E 265, OLG
1745.
72. Decision of Feb. 4, 1974 ("Haindl-Holtzmann"), BKartA, [1974] WuW/E 553, BKartA
1475.
73. A third type of abuse-the use of legal proceedings by a market-dominating enterprise
in order to achieve an anticompetitive effect-has had little practical effect. The only major
case involving this type of abuse was the proceeding against the automobile manufacturer
Volkswagenwerk AG for allegedly abusing its market-dominating position by introducing a
consignment system to evade the statutory prohibition of resale price maintenance. The case
was terminated after VW dropped its consignment plan. See GERMAN FEDERAL CARTEL OF-
FiCE, ANNUAL REPORT 84 (1973) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law
Journal).
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Commission frequently argue that measures to combat exclusionary prac-
tices against competitors should be given higher priority; but there is no
legal requirement that this be done.
1 Exclusionary Practices
Whereas the 1957 version of section 22 covered exclusionary practices
only indirectly,74 the 1965 version has evolved into a primary means to
control these practices. This evolution resulted from the difficulties the
Government encountered in attempting to enforce section 26(2). Although
that section prohibited exclusionary practices generally, until the 1973
amendment it could only be enforced by administrative fines, and the Car-
tel Authority wished to avoid the uncertainties of such quasi-criminal pro-
ceedings.
Reflecting this melding of enforcement practice under the two sections,
the term "abuse" in section 22 has been interpreted in much the same man-
ner as have the terms "unfair" and "unjustified" in section 26(2). Each re-
quires a balancing of the interests of all affected parties in light of the
statute's purpose to protect the freedom to compete.75 As a result, section 22
as applied to exclusionary practices has become almost completely inter-
changeable with section 26(2), abusive practices usually being controlled to
the same extent by both provisions.
The Meto case76 was the first to illustrate this development clearly. The
Federal Cartel Office there challenged Meto's use of a tying clause as an
abuse of a market-dominating position. The clause required purchasers of
invoicing machines manufactured by Meto to use Meto's labeling materials
exclusively for a period of five years after purchase. The Berlin Court of
Appeals stated generally that the criteria used to define an abuse must be
drawn from the principles underlying a competitive economic system. The
court then held that "economic power has to be eliminated where it impairs
the effectiveness of competition and competition's inherent tendencies to
promote efficiency and optimal satisfaction of consumers' demands. ' 77 The
control of abuses practiced by market-dominating enterprises "has as its
prime purpose to keep access to the market open to other enterprises. 78
Tying agreements are "typical cases of abuse of power within the meaning
of section 22(3) because they fortify market-dominating positions by means
74. Tying clauses, regulated by the section, were both an exploitation of customers and an
exclusionary practice against competitors.
75. See, e.g., Judgment of Sept. 27, 1962 ("Treuhandbdiro"), 38 BGHZ 90, 102, [1963]
WuW/E 240, 246, BGH 502, 508.
76. Judgment of Feb. 18, 1969 ("Handpreisauszeichner"), OLG, Berlin, [1969] WuW/E
623, OLG 995.
77. Id at 627, OLG 999.
78. Id
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other than greater efficiency and strangle competition of tomorrow.' ' 79 The
court found that buyers of the Meto products were not the only persons
damaged by the tying scheme. Also injured were other sellers of labeling
materials, whose share of the market was reduced by the discriminatory
practice.
The court rejected Meto's defense that the exclusive use of its labeling
material was necessary for a successful sales effort. The court said that such
an argument might be sustained under certain circumstances, but that sev-
eral factors prevented Meto from raising the defense successfully: Meto did
not render free services to the extent alleged; the additional income from
the buyers' obligation to use only Meto's expensive labels far exceeded the
cost of services actually rendered; free maintenance service was not neces-
sary to satisfy the buyers' needs or to promote the machines; and labels
produced by other firms did not impair the proper functioning of Meto's
machines. The court therefore enjoined Meto from including in its sales
contract tying clauses of more than six months duration.
The Federal Cartel Office reopened the case in 1975 in order to investi-
gate the five-year machine warranty service introduced by Meto after the
1969 judgment had become final.80 Meto purported to offer this service free
of extra charge, but solely on the condition that only Meto labeling mater-
ials would be used during the warranty period. The Federal Cartel Office
found that this plan largely frustrated the aim of the 1969 judgment-that
the labeling materials market be opened up to other suppliers. The failure
of these suppliers to capture a substantial part of that market despite their
lower prices resulted at least in part from the misleading impression created
by Meto's sales agents that use of other suppliers' materials could cause
difficulties when repair or replacement was necessary. Meto changed its
practice before a decision was made.
The Berlin Court of Appeals has reached conflicting results in two cases
in which the defendants sought to limit the public exposure of another
firm's products. The court held that an organizer of sporting goods fairs
engaged in an abusive exclusionary practice when it barred a manufacturer
from participating in fairs because the manufacturer did not restrict distri-
bution of its products to specialty shops.8 But the court upheld a contract
between the German Football Association (DFB) and the leading manufac-
turer of sports shoes (Adidas), under which DFB was to supply its national
teams with Adidas shoes exclusively and display the Adidas brand and im-
79. Id
80. GERMAN FEDERAL CARTEL OFFIcE, ANNUAL REPORT 52-53 (1975) (copy on file at the
offices of the Cornell International Law Journa4.
81. Judgment of July 22, 1968 ("Sportartikelmesse"), OLG, Berlin, [1968] WuW/E 849,
850, OLG 907, 908.
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age during games.82 The court rejected the assertion of the Federal Cartel
Office that this contract was abusive because it precluded Adidas's competi-
tors from using what was probably the most effective means available to
advertise football shoes. In the court's view, this exclusionary effect did not
threaten either the existence of competitors or the effectiveness of competi-
tion. It was therefore outweighed by DFB's interest in receiving the agreed
payments from Adidas to finance youth training programs.
Predatory pricing may also constitute an abusive exclusionary practice
when employed by a market-dominating enterprise. In its case against
Tourist Union International (TUI), the largest domestic package travel tour
operator,83 the Federal Cartel Office found that TUI had cut prices sub-
stantially for tours to Ischia, Italy. In order to counteract strong competition
from a small, specialized package tour operator, TUI had discounted these
tours below their actual cost and had allocated the difference to the ex-
penses of its other operations. After the Federal Cartel Office advised TUI
that the Office considered the discounted prices to be an abuse designed to
drive competitors out of the market, TUI conformed the prices to its gen-
eral pricing policy and the case was closed without a formal decision by the
Cartel Authority.
The present scope of control over exclusionary practices under sections
22 and 26(2) can best be seen from the development of the Springer
Newspapers case.84 The leading German newspaper publisher, Axel
Springer Verlag AG, offered a combination price plan to advertisers in its
local newspaper, Berliner Morgenpost, and the Berlin editions of its na-
tional newspapers, Die Welt and Die Welt am Sonntag. Those who agreed
to place the same advertisement in several of the Springer newspapers were
offered a reduced price compared to that which they would have been
charged had the advertisements been placed individually.85 The Berlin
State Antitrust Authority issued a preliminary restraining order, prohibiting
the scheme under sections 22 and 26(2) on the ground that it adversely af-
fected the smaller, independent newspaper Der Tagessoiegel But on appeal,
the Berlin Court of Appeals held that the Springer scheme did not violate
82. Judgment of Nov. 20, 1973 ("Deutsches Fup3ball Bund"), OLG, Berlin, [1974] WuW/E
189, OLG 1429.
83. GERMAN FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 76-77 (1975)(copy on file at the
offices of the Cornell InternafionalLaw Journal). In 1976, the Cartel Office opened proceedings
against restrictions imposed by TUI on the entry of travel agencies into the group permitted to
sell tours and on the freedom of those in the group to sell tours offered by TUI competitors.
Both restrictions were reduced to the satisfaction of the Federal Cartel Office. See id. at 81.
84. Judgment of Jan. 26, 1977 ("Kombinationstaril"), OLG, Berlin, [1977] WuW/E 343,
OLG 1767.
85. Under the plan, the combined price for an advertisement appearing simultaneously in
Berliner Morgenpostand Die Wetwas DM 4.40 per millimeter, instead of DM 4.00 and .70 for
separate advertising in a single newspaper.
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the statute and reversed the state authority's order.86
The court of appeals agreed with the state antitrust authority's finding
that Springer held a paramount market position in the Berlin newspaper
advertisement market. The court also pointed out that a finding of an abuse
was not barred by the fact that other enterprises not occupying a market-
dominating position employed the same practice. Exclusionary practices,
the court said, must be judged by their impact on the market. Market-
dominating enterprises have, therefore, a special duty of care toward actual
and potential competitors.
At this point in its analysis of the case, the court's approach diverged
from that of the state authority and led the court to an opposite result. Not
every restraint imposed upon competitors by the market conduct of a
market-dominating enterprise is an abuse, the court said. Anticompetitive
practices are abusive only if by such practices, "competition in the market is
threatened to be extinguished or to be adversely affected in a very serious
manner," and if the practice in question is contrary to the principles of
competition by performance.8 7 The Springer combination price scheme, ac-
cording to the court, met only the latter condition. Thus, even though it was
a form of tying, albeit on a voluntary basis, it did not constitute an abuse of
the newspapers' dominant market position.
In reaching this conclusion, the court refused to accept that the evidence
showed a sufficiently strong adverse effect of the Springer plan on Der
Tagesspiegels advertising business. Instead, the court focused on the fact
that Der Tagesspiegers advertising receipts had not declined during the first
two months that the Springer scheme was in effect. The court also expressed
doubts that advertisers who wished to reach readers of Der Tagesspiegel
could afford to stop advertising in that newspaper in order to take advan-
tage of the discount offered by the Springer newspapers. Because Der
Tagesspiegel had not shown the irreparable injury necessary to obtain a
preliminary restraining order, the court reversed the state authority's order.
These cases illustrate that sections 22 and 26(2) have been forged into a
strong weapon against exclusionary practices of market-dominating enter-
prises that intend to defend or strengthen their market position against ac-
tual or potential competitors. These provisions clearly extend beyond
classical monopolization practices, such as exclusive dealing agreements
86. Judgment of Jan. 26, 1977 ("Kombinationstarif'), OLG, Berlin, [1977] WuW/E 343,
OLG 1767.
87. This concept, Leirtungswetibewerb, is not found in U.S. antitrust law. The courts have
developed it by applying § I of the Unfair Trade Practices Act. Gesetz gegen den Unlauteren
Wettbewerb, June 7, 1909, [1909] Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 1 499, as amended June 26, 1969,
[1969] BGBI 1633 [hereinafter cited as UWG]. The concept was later included in the proce-
dure for trade practices rules (GWB § 28). For a recent analysis of the whole concept, see
Ulmer, Der Begrffi 'eitungswellbewerb" und seine Bedeulungfd idie Anwendung Yon GWB
und UWG-Tatbestdndeg [1977] GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHIBERRECHT 565.
GERMAN ANTITR UST LAW
and contractual tying clauses, to include so-called voluntary tying as in the
second Meto and the Springer Newspapers cases as well as predatory pric-
ing as in the Tourist Union International case. But in light of the Berlin
Court of Appeals Springer Newspapers decision, the requirements for show-
ing the necessary adverse effects of the challenged practices on competitors
are too strict to make the concept sufficiently workable.88
To preserve remaining competition in dominated markets as well as ac-
cess to those markets by outsiders, the statutory sanctions must be applied
at a much earlier stage. The incipiency doctrine in U.S. antitrust law8 9 pro-
vides a useful model. Yet overregulation by protecting competitors at the
expense of market competition must be avoided. Just as a general prohibi-
tion of price discrimination can restrict or even extinguish price competition
in the market,90 a rigidly enforced general ban of all practices adversely
affecting competitors is likely to paralyze the vigor of competition in the
market.91 Further, although a market-dominating firm's unusually low
prices may damage its competitors' market position, consumer interests
may be served by the price reductions.92 This calls for a middle course in
the application of sections 22 and 26(2) to exclusionary practices-a course
that requires a great deal more refinement than is now possible on the basis
of the few decided cases.
88. For a critical review of the court of appeals decision, see Ulmer, [1977] DaR BETRIEBS-
BERATER 561 (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal). See also P.
ULMER, SCHRANKEN ZULASSIGEN WETTBEWERBS MARTBEHERRSCHENDER UNTERNERMEN
(1977). The latter work treats a similar case involving a compulsory combination price scheme
that was stayed by the Northrhine-Westphalian state antitrust authority for reasons similar to
those advanced in the Springer Newspapers case.
89. The "incipiency doctrine" arises out of § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976),
which prohibits any merger tending to lessen competition or create a monopoly. The legisla-
tive history of the section reveals that the drafters intended to grant authority to stop monopo-
listic tendencies in their incipiency. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950);
H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949). The courts have supported this congres-
sional purpose with enthusiasm. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-
18 (1962); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957). See
generally P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYsIs 697-702 (2d ed. 1974).
90. This appears to be a generally accepted view in relation to the price discrimination
provisions of the U.S. Robinson-Patman Act. See U.S. DnP'T OF JUSTIcE, REPORT ON THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr (1977). In Germany, there is still discussion whether a similar enter-
prise discrimination law should be adopted. The German Federal Government, the Monopo-
lies Commission, and the Federal Cartel Office have persistently opposed such proposals.
91. This danger arises in particular if the concept of violating LeistungswettbewerA UWG
§ 1, would be overextended. Seenote 87 supra
92. This does not apply of course to cases of clear predatory intent such as the Tourist Union
International case. See note 83 supra and accompanying text. The dilemma arises in two situ-
ations. First, prices on some products may be set at unusually low levels in order to promote
the sale of other products, such as when a supermarket sells gasoline below cost. Second, ab-
normally low prices may be made possible by special circumstances, such as the high advertis-
ing receipts received by leading newspaper publishers that make it possible to sell newspapers
at a very low price without selling below cost. See Ulmer, supra note 88.
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2. Abusively High Prices
In the last decade, section 22 has also evolved into a potent means to
control abusive pricing practices of market-dominating firms. The most re-
cent case reflecting this development is the Federal Supreme Court's judg-
ment in the Valium case. This trend began with the Cartel Office's 1967
challenge of the pricing practices of the German subsidiaries of several
large international oil companies. 93 After the Suez Canal was closed in
June 1967, the subsidiaries raised their retail gasoline prices several times
by increments of DM 0.05 per liter. The higher prices were maintained until
the fall of 1967, although the supply situation had improved considerably in
the interim and transportation costs, claimed as a justification for the higher
prices, had dropped substantially. The Federal Cartel Office initiated pro-
ceedings, alleging that the firms had long followed a policy of parallel mar-
ket conduct and were, therefore, a market-dominating oligopoly under
section 22(2). The Cartel Office further alleged that the failure of the firms
to reduce prices after the justifications for the higher prices had ceased to
exist constituted an abusive practice within the meaning of section 22. After
public hearings at which Esso, Shell, British Petroleum, and DEA (a Tex-
aco subsidiary) appeared, the Federal Cartel Office indicated that it would
issue an order to reduce prices. Esso then started to lower its price by an
average of about DM .02 per liter, other firms followed suit, and the pro-
ceedings were terminated.
In defining the abuse in such cases, the Federal Cartel Office relied on the
"as if competition" concept as stated in the Explanatory Memorandum to
the 1955 Government Bill.94 The "as if competition" standard has provided
the basis for a number of cases brought by the Federal Cartel Office, espe-
cially since the 1973 amendment added new criteria for finding market
domination. Some of the cases, notably the Braun Electric Shavers case 95
93. GERMAN FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 41 (1967) (copy on file at the
offices of the Cornell International Law Journal). See also Barnikel, 4buse oPower by Domi-
nant Firms: 4pplication ofthe German Laq 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 221, 231-40 (1969).
94. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. The general position of the German Federal
Cartel Office on price abuses was first stated in its 1967 Annual Report:
Insofar as section 22 covers the situation that market power is abused in the domi-
nated market in relation to customers on the other side of the market (Gasoline case),
its aim is to protect customers from disadvantages that the market-dominating enter-
prises can impose on them because they are not exposed to effective competition. Any
practice of a market-dominating firm is abusive if it leads to market results that, with
reasonable certainty, could not be achieved if substantial competition had existed in
the market.
GERMAN FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1967) (copy on file at the offices of
the Cornell International Law Journal.
95. GERMAN FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 85 (1973); id. at 57 (1974) (copies
on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
GERMAN ANTITRUST LAW
and the Sugar case,96 resulted in price reductions similar to those obtained
in the Gasoline case. But in others, such as the 1974 and 1976 Automobile
cases, 97 the proceedings were terminated because no abuse was found.
Of all the cases brought, only three resulted in formal decisions against
abusively high prices. In the first, the Berlin Court of Appeals suspended
the immediate effect of an order by the Federal Cartel Office against the
German subsidiary of British Petroleum. The court did so on the ground
that the evidence presented failed to prove that the firm's increased prices
were abusively high.98 In the second case, the court of appeals affirmed in
substance an order of the Federal Cartel Office99 against the German
pharmaceutical firm Ernst Merck for charging excessive prices for vitamin
B-12.10 On appeal, however, the Federal Supreme Court held that Merck
did not occupy a market-dominating position. 10 1 The third case to result in
a formal decision against abusively high prices arose out of the Federal
Cartel Office's 1974 order to German Hoffmann-La Roche to reduce its
prices for Valium by 40 percent and its prices for Librium by 35 percent.102
German Hoffmann-La Roche bought the patented ingredient necessary
to manufacture the tranquilizers from its Swiss parent company at a price
that was ninety times the market price in Italy, where no patent protection
existed. As a licensee of its Swiss parent, German Hoffmann-La Roche also
paid substantial license fees. These made the total transfer price paid for the
ingredient 130 times the manufacturing cost.
To measure precisely how excessive the retail prices were, the Cartel Of-
fice used the Italian market price for the ingredient as a standard of mea-
surement, rather than the price that German Hoffmann-La Roche paid its
Swiss parent company. Against the percentage difference it found, the Of-
fice allowed offsets of 14.23 percent for research and development costs and
17.6 percent for advertising costs. The Office also calculated that German
96. GERMAN FEDERAL CARTEL OFFIcE, ANNUAL REPORT 71 (1975) (copy on file at the
offices of the Cornell International Law Journa.
97. GERMAN FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNuAL REPORT 54 (1974); id. at 53 (1976) (copies
on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal). In 1977, the Federal Cartel
Office issued a warning to the three leading car manufacturers, Volkswagen, Opel, and Ford,
that anticipated price increases would be suspected as an abuse. The Cartel Office did not
intervene when prices were raised by 3.9 percent a few weeks later.
98. Judgment of May 14, 1974 ("BP"), OLG, Berlin, [1974] WuW/E 549, OLG 1467.
99. Decision of Mar. 21, 1974 ("Vitamin B-12"), BKartA, [1974] WuW/E 560, BKartA
1482.
100. Judgment of Mar. 19, 1975 ("Vitamin B-12"), OLG, Berlin, [1975] WuW/E 649, OLG
1599.
101. Judgment of July 3, 1976 ("Vitamin B-12"), 67 BGHZ 104, [1976] WuW/E 783, BGH
1435.
102. Decision of Oct. 16, 1974 ("Valium-Librium"), BKartA, [1975] WuW/E 84, BKartA
1526. The Federal Cartel Office also decided that the order should have immediate effect, but
this decision was reversed by an intermediate ruling of the Berlin Court of Appeals. SeeJudg-
ment of Nov. 15, 1974 ("Valium-Librium I"), OLG, Berlin, [1975] WuW/E 281, OLG 1547.
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Hoffmann-La Roche was entitled to the same 22.4 percent profit margin
that it received on its combined domestic sales of pharmaceuticals. Both the
excessiveness of the price and the need for a reduction were confirmed by
the 36 percent drop in Valium and Librium prices in the United Kingdom
after United Kingdom Hoffnann-La Roche was required to grant licenses
to two other competing manufacturers.10 3
The Berlin Court of Appeals sustained the Cartel Office's finding that the
Valium and Librium prices of German Hoffmann-La Roche were abusively
high, but the court reduced the price roll-back to 28 percent104 It agreed
with the Cartel Office that the extent of an abuse must be measured by the
"as if competition" concept, but emphasized that only "significant" depar-
tures from the "as if competition" price were abusive. 0 5 The "as if compe-
tition" price, the court said, should be determined by comparing the price
charged by the market-dominating firm with the same product's prices in
other, more competitive markets, rather than by comparing profit margins
as was the principal approach of the Cartel Office.' 06
The court also rejected the Federal Cartel Office's use of the Italian in-
gredient price and the reduced prices for Valium and Librium in the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom as bases for finding that German
Hoffmann-La Roche's price was excessive. According to the court, interna-
tional price differences for the same product, even if maintained for a long
period of time, do not necessarily indicate an abuse.10 7 Instead, the court
compared German Hoffman-La Roche's prices with those of Centrafarm,
an importer in the Netherlands. The court adjusted the Dutch firm's prices
upward to compensate for three special costs born by German Hoffmann-
La Roche as a result of structural differences between the Dutch and Ger-
man markets. Relying on a disputed private research report submitted by
German Hoffmann-La Roche, the court first made a 25 percent markup to
103. UNITED KINGDOM MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, CHLORDIAZEPOXIDE AND DIAZEPAM: A
REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF CHLORDIAZEPOXIDE AND DIAZEPAM, H.C. 197, at 1 (1973).
104. Judgment of Jan. 5, 1976 ("Valium Librium"), OLG, Berlin, [1976] WuW/E 313, OLG
1645.
105. Id. at 321, OLG 1653.
106. Id.
107. As to the Italian price, the court reasoned that its view was justified by the fact that
there is no patent protection in Italy.
Although [German Hoffmann-La] Roche like other enterprises must include general
research and management costs in its calculation, the situation in Italy is substantially
different, because imitating competitors in their price calculation can ignore a substan-
tial part of the research costs. The competitive situation of [German Hoffmann-La]
Roche in attempting to maintain its position in the Italian market is therefore not
comparable with its position in Germany.
Id.
As to state-controlled prices, the court said that such prices cannot be used for the purposes
of the market comparison concept. "Otherwise dirigistic measures of other states would be
indirectly transferred into our market economy." Id.
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reflect higher general costs of the pharmaceutical industry in Germany. The
court then added a second 25 percent adjustment to compensate for the fact
that both Valium and Librium are still under patent protection in Ger-
many. Finally, another 10 percent markup was made to reflect special costs
attributable to German Hoffmann-La Roche's performance of ancillary
services and the firm's high reputation in the market. Since Centrafarm did
not sell Librium, the court had to infer from its findings about Valium that
Librium prices were equally excessive. The court therefore applied the
same 28 percent price reduction to Librium and left German Hoffmann-La
Roche with a 21 percent of sales profit margin on both compounds.
The Federal Supreme Court reversed the Berlin Court of Appeals and
remanded the case to that court for clarification of the facts.108 The
supreme court agreed with the Cartel Office and the court of appeals that
German Hoffmann-La Roche held a dominant position in the relevant
market and that prices of a dominant firm that are significantly higher than
prices under competitive conditions are an abuse under section 22.
The supreme court endorsed in principle the lower court's comparison of
the Dutch firm's prices with German Hoffmann-La Roche's, but differed
with the court of appeals on two of the three calculations derived from the
comparison. Although the adjustment for general costs was correct, the re-
search cost adjustment may have been too low. The lower court did not give
sufficient weight to the fact that Centrafarm, a possible patent infringer,
could offer a lower price than a licensee. The third adjustment for ancillary
services and market reputation was unfounded, the court said, because it
did not reflect differences in the structure of both markets. Finally, the
supreme court criticized the court of appeals calculation of these adjust-
ments to Centrafarm's prices, because the lower court did not clearly distin-
guish between determination of the relevant hypothetical market price and
determination of the additional margin by which that price may be in-
creased before it is significantly higher.
The Federal Supreme Court's Valium decision is an important judicial
clarification of the application of section 22 to market-dominating firms. 109
The case establishes that excessive prices may be an abuse under section 22,
that the extent of such an abuse is to be measured according to the hypo-
thetical competitive price, and that antitrust authorities have the power to
prohibit prices that are significantly higher than the hypothetical competi-
tive price. But the impetus these developments give to vigorous enforcement
of the competition law is diminished by the method's stringent proof re-
108. Judgment of Dec. 16, 1976 ("Valium"), 68 BGHZ 23, [1977] WuW/E 255, BGH 1445.
109. The very controversial views on this question in the legal and economic literature are
best summarized in D. MUNZINGER, MIPBRXUCHLICHE PREISE, PPEISBILDUNGSSYSTEME UND
PREISSTRUKTUREN NACH § 22 GWB (1977).
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quirements. These constitute strong impediments to effective enforcement.
Proof of abusive pricing of nationally sold products under this new test
apparently requires the identification of a more competitive foreign market
for the same type of product against which price comparisons can be made.
Even where a foreign market is available for comparative purposes, upward
adjustments of the foreign market prices to compensate for market structure
differences may reduce the effectiveness of monetary penalties for abuses
under section 22.
Two further flaws mar the supreme court's approach. Ordinary research
and development costs of a market-dominating enterprise do not generally
justify increasing the hypothetical market price. An upward adjustment is
warranted only if the firm holds patents or valuable know-how that a com-
petitor would need in order to compete. The court's requirement that ad-
justments to the hypothetical market price and a further "significance"
margin be separately determined and presented also hinders enforcement.
According to the court, the former calculations must be made "with all nec-
essary care" so as to take account of the uncertainties of the comparison
data. If at this stage the dominant firm is given full benefit of any doubt as
to the weight of the evidence, there is no justification for a further "signifi-
cance" margin that the court would apply. The supreme court's approach
seems even more questionable if individual attributes of the market-
dominating firm, such as its special image or reputation in the market, may
form the basis for further favorable adjustments in the hypothetical market
price.
The geographic market comparison approach employed by the Federal
Supreme Court in the Valium case cannot be regarded as an effective means
to determine the abuse involved in the pricing policy of market-dominating
firms. In view of the even greater difficulties inherent in other methods of
determining the "as if competition" price in dominated markets, it is doubt-
ful whether the "as if competition" concept is a practicable method to con-
trol exploitation of dominant market power. The concept may be
theoretically satisfactory. But because of the great uncertainties involved in
its application, the strict proof requirements, and the availability ofjudicial
review-even giving the market-dominating firm any possible benefit of the
doubt-it is simply not effective.
To remedy this enforcement dilemma, the courts might reduce this heavy
burden of proof on the Government." 0 But in light of the Parliament's
clear preference for the "as if competition" standard, it is highly unlikely
that the courts will adopt a different standard to define the abuse, such as
110. This is essentially the conclusion of a recent analysis of the present situation by
Engelbrecht-Nagel, Probleme der Preiskontrolle nach dern GWA [1977] DER BETRIEB 1237,
1243 (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
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the profit comparisons test applied by the British Monopolies Commis-
sion' I ' or the "unfairness" standard contained in article 86 of the Treaty of
Rome. 12 Thus, without amending the present law, no substantial progress
can be expected in the application of section 22 to exploitative practices by
market-dominating firms.
In its memorandum on the first biennial report of the Monopolies Com-
mission, the German Federal Government acknowledged the need to con-
sider whether a statutory revision of the abuse concept would be possible
and useful. But the Government's Bill of May 17, 1978 to amend the GWB
does not provide for new definitions. 113 Rather, the Bill would illustrate the
term "abuse" in section 113 (which deals with practices of public utilities)
by citing a number of specific practices that the term would include.' 14 The
same should be done with section 22. For example, section 22 should be
amended to provide that where a market-dominating enterprise engages in
territorial price discrimination, the higher price is presumed to be an abuse,
unless the enterprise proves that the price difference is justified.
In markets where competitive pricing cannot be expected, more direct
methods of price control could be adopted, such as a system of prior notifi-
cation of price increases coupled with a short waiting period during which
the Cartel Authority could object to the increase.' 1 5 Admittedly, the experi-
ence of West Germany and other countries with price controls has not been
111. See, e.g., the British Valium case, supra note 103 and accompanying text. See also
Rhinelander, The Roche Case: One Giant Stepfor British Antitrust, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1974).
On British practice regarding prices of market-dominating enterprises, see generally P.
GUENAULT.& J. JACKSON, THE CONTROL OF MONOPOLY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (2d ed.
1974).
112. Treaty of Rome, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. Article 86 defines the term
"abuse" by giving examples of several types of abusive practices, including "directly or indi-
rectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions." The Euro-
pean Community Commission first invoked this clause against the United Brands Co. See
Decision of Dec. 17, 1975, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 95) 1 (1975), reprinted in 2 COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) T 9800. The unfairness of United Brands banana prices in several EEC
member countries was inferred by the Commission from lower prices of competing brands in
the same countries and from lower United Brands prices quoted to buyers in Ireland. The
Court of Justice in its judgment of Feb. 14, 1978, case 27/76, reversed this part of the Commis-
sion's order, but affirmed the principle that unfair prices of a market-dominating firm are an
abuse within the meaning of article 86.
113. SeeBundesratdrucksache 231/78 (1978) (copy on file at the offices of the CornellInter-
national Law Journal). The Bill, in § 1(19), merely proposes that all orders rendered under
GWB § 22 be effective immediately, subject to the respondent's right to ask the appropriate
appellate court to stay execution of the order. Once an order became final, the Bill would
permit damages to be claimed from the date the order was issued, id § 1(19), and would allow
the Government to "skim off' profits resulting from the abuse, id § 1(11).
114. Id § 1(27).
115. See Markert, Kostenkontrolle bei der Missbrauchsaufsicht iber marktbeherrschende
Unternehmen, [1974] DER BETRIEBs-BERATER 580, 583 (copy on file at the offices of the Cor-
nell International Law Journal).
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particularly encouraging.' 6 But controls could and should be used as a last
resort-when all other means of competition policy, including restructuring
the industry in question, cannot reasonably be expected to restore competi-
tion. 117
CONCLUSION
The German law governing market-dominating enterprises is a typical
example of the conduct approach to existing market power that forms the
basis of most antitrust laws outside the United States. Because it focuses on
reduced competition in specific markets, this approach encounters the same
market definition problems that arise in many American merger cases. Ger-
man attempts to develop workable definitions of actionable market power
for both monopolists and oligopolists also parallel American antitrust expe-
rience.
The practical problems in German antitrust practice of defining the rele-
vant market and determining actionable market power remain substantial,
but are not insoluble. The critical issue of the German approach is to iden-
tify abusive practices by market-dominating enterprises and counteract
them, yet simultaneously to avoid endangering the competitive forces of the
market. Although German antitrust enforcement practice is not yet fully
developed, jurists already recognize that overextending protection of com-
petitors against exclusionary practices of market-dominating enterprises
may substantially reduce market competition. Observers have also recog-
nized the inherent limitations of any system of conduct control based on
antitrust standards that seek to protect customers from exploitation by
market-dominating firms. This remains the least developed aspect of the
German approach and, despite enormous practical difficulties, requires fur-
ther experimentation by the Parliament and the Cartel Authority.
Analysis of the German experience cannot alone resolve whether Ameri-
can antitrust law should place greater emphasis on controlling the conduct
of market-dominating enterprises. But the application of section 22 to oli-
gopolies may assist current American attempts to deal with oligopoly
power.118 Similarly, German efforts to define market domination may
provide a useful contrast to American attempts to do the same.' 19 By pro-
116. Rate regulation requiring prior authorization of price increases is applied to several
regulated German industries, such as transportation, electricity, and automobile liability insur-
ance. For a study of the American experience, see A. PHILLIPS, PROMOTING COMPETITION IN
REGULATED MARKETS (1975).
117. A market for which such price controls might be necessary is the pharmaceutical indus-
try. In most other countries of Western Europe where such controls are applied, prices are
substantially lower than in Germany.
118. Kellogg Co., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,898.
119. An example of the increasing importance of market domination as a test of monopoly
or oligopoly power in American antitrust law enforcement is the Railroad Revitalization and
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viding a comparative perspective, examination of the German experience
may contribute to the refinement of American antitrust law enforcement
practice.
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-110, 90 Stat. 31 (1976) (codified in scattered
sections of 29, 45, 49 U.S.C.). The Act gives railroads subject to its provisions almost unlimited
freedom to set non-discriminatory rates for traffic over which they do not have "market domi-
nance." 49 U.S.C. § 1(5)(a)-(b) (1976). "Market dominance" is defined to be "an absence of
effective competition from other carriers or modes of transportation." Id § 5(c)(i). Since pas-
sage of the Act, attention has focused on how to define more specifically this test of market
dominance. The Department of Justice opposed a rule proposed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission that a railroad be deemed to be market-dominating when it handles 70 percent or
more of the traffic in question. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL 57 (1976). The proposed rule was subsequently modified. Id
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